

Being-in-relation to, and with, the Lived-World: the distinction between the Self-of-Being, and the Self-of-Human-Person in Time-Limited Existential Psychotherapy and Counselling

Introduction:

In being-in-the-world, or being-there (Da-Sein), we seem to be, perpetually, confronted with the 'Existential givens' of life, itself. Yalom (1980) identified these Existential givens as 'freedom to choose, isolation, meaninglessness, and death'. These 'givens' not only present for us possibilities, but also present for us limitations to our being-in-the-world, or being-there within which we are required to choose how to be. When confronted with these 'givens', we seem to construct a self-of-being-in-the-world that reflects the relative ease with which we accept, or deny, these inevitable challenges to our very existence; suffice to say, some of us seem to cope better than others. But, to what extent is the distinction between the self-of-being-in-the-world, (i.e. the ontological), and the self-of-the-human-person', (i.e. the ontic), be made within Time-limited Existential Psychotherapy and Counselling (Strasser and Strasser, 1997/1999)?

This Cartesian distinction between object, (i.e. the ontic), and subject, (i.e. the ontological), should be made as it signifies the interface between self-of-human-person as we perceived ourselves to be in isolation of others, and self-of-being as experienced by others. More importantly, the distinction signifies self-of-human-person as a "composite of givens or pre-dispositions", and self-of-being - the created being-in-the-world; both show relation to each other, but not necessarily, indicative of the other. One implies the existence of the other; though one does not, necessarily, presuppose the existence of the other (Husserl, 1923; Buber, 1966). This distinction allows for the differences between 'how' we perceive ourselves to be in-ourselves-for-ourselves, and 'how' we might appear to be perceived by others. Such distinctions may be 'uncovered' when exploring the narratives of our everyday lives in-relation with a sentient being.

Barnes (1990) argues that we are a process of embodied consciousness, which reflects on itself, rather being on, or in, the other. But it could be argued that in reflecting on itself in-relation with the other, our embodied consciousness becomes responsive to its interpretation of whatever it perceives. Interpretation does not necessitate understanding. But through our perception of other's responses in-relation to ourselves we may come to know ourselves as perceived by the other to greater or lesser extent. Not as the other but as an interpretation of how we may appear to be in-relation to the other. This, in-itself, may be as if 'nothing' in-relation with the other. But it could be argued that even in being 'nothing', we are being 'something', and we are always being 'something' even when confronted with the possibility of our own isolation. If, it assumed that the self-of-being is reflective of the self-of-the-human-person (Buber 1966), and that two represent "polarities of being" that appear to be inextricably, and dynamically-linked, along a continuum of being-in-the-world that is

'temporo-spatial' (Heidegger, 1927), then do we not become both 'ontic', and 'ontological'; both in the same time-space continuum, and to so do, in consideration of what may be considered to be both an immanent, (i.e. ready-to-hand), and transcendent, (i.e. present-to-hand), experiencing of being-there (Heidegger, 1927; Merleau-Ponty, 1968).

Often, I have wondered 'how' is it that we manage to construct a 'sense of self' that is so different from 'how' we suggest that we would 'prefer' to be-in-the-world. I imagine that we would 'prefer' to be as we are, truly, rather than as our experience within the context of our everyday lives, dictates. But is this not as we are any way? Somehow, we become something/someone that reflects the nature of the contexts in which we choose to live at the expense of how we might be, if, we chose to live in any other context of the lived-world. Again I presume that there is a 'difference', though intuitively, I feel that this merely reflects a difference in my own perception on reflection of life as it appears to me. This view of 'sameness'; irrespective, of variation in context; appears to be one reflected by Kierkegaard (1849). However, Husserl makes the distinction between the act of knowing (noesis), and the object about which we strive for knowledge. In the same way, we may distinguish between the self-of-the-human-person, and the self-of-being.

To be conscious of the self-of-being in which we are aware of the self-of-the-human-person, but there is no certainty within this conscious act. To be conscious of self is to be aware of the possibilities of human existence at a given time and place, therefore, as Parmenides concludes 'only that which can be known is, and that which genuinely is excludes coming to being, and passing away'. If, we are to do 'science' on people then we must conclude that they are fixed entities which when reduced to the sphere of immanence, cannot be reduced any further: there is nothing else to discover. Thus to act intentionally in either one way or another, or as one human person to another, is assume that the other conveys meanings which are, in themselves, irreducible, and rigid/fixed, in time and place. There is no possibility of transcending, and no regression, beyond that which seems inherent in our acts of intentionality. Our humanity inherent in our selves-of-being is lost, and we are reduced to mere objects reflective of our selves-of-the-human-person. Intentional acts reflected in our ways of being-in-the-world may well have timeless meaning, but we are people are embodied within something that is both finite, and infinite, and the finite cannot have timeless meaning. It is hoped that through applying an existential-phenomenological approach (Spinelli, 1989) to this question, something of the very 'essence' on which this distinction may be investigated within the context of Time-limited Existential Therapy. Examples from my own client work will be used to illustrate my thinking on this matter.

Discussion:

'Time-limited Existential Psychotherapy and Counselling' seems to conjure-up its own dilemmas, (i.e. 'catch-22' situations), and paradoxes, (i.e. inconsistencies), from a methodological perspective, which may be construed as being different from those conjured-up in Existential therapy that is 'open-ended' (Strasser and Strasser, 1997). By conjure-up I mean 'as if by magic', and use the term in much the same way as Sartre (1962) does in his book 'A Sketch of a theory of the Emotions'. Brentano speaks of the intentionality of consciousness, and we must assume that our interventions with our clients are intentional even though the outcome may not be judged purposeful in so much as we have achieved a specific purpose by making a deliberate intervention. 'Existential Time-limited Psychotherapy' presents as a 'limit situation' where the rules/sedimentations may appear implicit, or explicit; or, conjured-up as we go along (Jaspers, 1951). Such limit 'situations' are said to give meaning to the life we live with our clients during our encounters within a given tempo-spatial framework. We are 'free-to-be' within the constraints we set for ourselves within this context, and in so doing, exist for each other at that time and in that place (Tillich, 1951). I am curious here; in consideration of time-limited existential therapy, at the extent to which we seem drawn to impose 'structure' to our encounters. We can but accept personal responsibility for the ways in which we appear to be in-relation with the other, and struggle to offer the other the opportunity to be as 'free-to-be' in-relation as we would want to be for- and in-ourselves. But I ponder whether this is a true reflection of the human condition, and as such would this apparent imposition occur, if, therapy were open-ended? We speak within the limitations and possibilities that we appear to conjure-up for ourselves; we begin and finish our encounters within given times; we apply therapeutic frameworks to guide our work; all in much the same ways as we appear to do within the context of our everyday lives, and hence, may be the distinction we make between the 'self of being', and the 'self of the human person'; as indicated by Buber (1923: 1929); would seem inevitable?

As 'temporal beings', we seem to attempt to attach meaning to every aspect of our life, and make life choices/distinctions based on the 'value' we ascribe to such meaning, and inevitably the 'thing', itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997). We ascribe aesthetic', and/or 'functional', value to people as, if, they were 'substantial objects', and this begs the question as to what happens to those things/people who are deemed to be devoid of either 'aesthetic' or 'functional' value? Do they cease to exist in the eyes and minds of others? In saying that we are all inextricably linked, we are saying that 'you exist for me when and where I exist for you', and in so doing, determine that 'you exist for me in either this way or that', as 'I exist for you in either this way or that'. This invites judgements based on our everyday experiences of being-in-the-world, and the ascription of 'value' judgements, (i.e. the extent to which those judgments are deemed 'true', (Van-Deurzen-Smith, 1988). In identifying the desirable in others are we not saying, 'yes, you are desirable to me', and also, 'you

are very desirable; or not so desirable', as the case may be? Do we not also apply moral judgement to these substantial objects/people, and say, 'yes you are desirable, and that this in-itself, is either a 'good thing', or a 'bad thing'? Not so.

It seems to me that we deconstruct the other in to what could be construed as being desirable and not so desirable components. Those with enough desirable components are judged desirable in the subjective sense, and those with less are judged desirable in the objective sense. The idea of being desirable enough. The ascription of 'value' to the other has, always, fascinated me, in one-way, or another. How do we decide that one particular aspect of the other is more valuable than another either aesthetically, or functionally? Are we saying that one or more aspects of the other is either/and pleasing, or useful personally, because s/he reflects some aspect of myself that I like; or, are we saying that this particular aspect of the other is absent within myself, but that it is necessary to be able to demonstrate my approval of this aspect of the other, and is so doing, secure the apparently-desired relations with the world? I remain uncertain. It appears that we can apply a singular mode of ascription, (i.e. liking something because we ourselves like it), or plural mode of ascription, (i.e. liking something because others seem to like it), and that the distinction between how we appear to be in-relation with our lived-worlds, and how we appear to be in-relation to our lived-worlds, can be made along these lines. In these ways we seem to set the other apart, and either make the other independent or dependent, respectively, to greater or lesser degree (Buber, 1966). We can but take responsibility for the extent to which we make this movement in-relation with others within the context of our lived-worlds.

Van-Deurzen-Smith (1997) conjures-up/reveals for us something of the 'interrelatedness' of between the four dimensions of our existence, (i.e. the 'physical', the 'social', the 'personal' and the 'spiritual' (ibid, pg100), and how the 'clarification' of their connectedness may help elucidate how we are in relation to, and with, our lived-worlds by first separating them out. Merleau-Ponty (1968) conjures-up for us some understanding of the way that within which we are embodied senses the 'Umwelt', (i.e. world-around or physical-world), and constructs for itself the 'Mitwelt' (i.e. social-world), the 'Eigenwelt', (i.e. personal-world), and 'Uberwelt', (i.e. spiritual-world or world of meaning), from the 'raw materials' of that which has been 'sensed'. He says we speak as, if, there is some certainty about the world-around, etc., and the contexts of our everyday lives in which we find ourselves, when in reality there is none. Sartre (1939) goes on step further, and argues that we refer to the 'sedimentations' of our existence as if they were concrete facts, or 'mineralisations', when in reality we are just as likely to 'transform' our sedimentations to suit our purposes by virtue of the fact that the core/beliefs and values which seem to underpin our everyday experiences seem more like 'sedimentations' as opposed to 'mineralisations'. In the same ways, we speak of the 'self of being' and the self of the human person'

as if they, too, were concrete entities, and this in-itself seems to detract from their apparent 'fluidity' and 'interrelatedness'.

Here, I make the analogy between Merleau-Ponty's idea of interrelatedness between ourselves, and the world around, and it is suggested that the same 'interrelatedness' may be ascribed to Buber's idea 'self of being', and the 'self of the human person'. In true Taoist tradition it is argued that neither can be superimposed on the other, nor can either supplant the other. The two represent 'dynamicity', and 'fluidity', that seems to be essential to existence, and human condition, and facilitate human growth and development in way or another. This dynamicity may be illustrated in reference to the client who appears to me to present to the world as a person who became violent and abusive in specific contexts, and in-relation to, and with, people who were being in-relation to, and with him, in a particular way. So, for instance, he appeared to be violent and abusive in-relation with others when he was confronted with the possibility that they other would discover that he did not have enough money to pay for things that they both believed he should contribute. His 'self of being', (i.e. his being abusive/violent), and his 'self of the human person', (i.e. his being someone who should have enough money to contribute to the family shopping), appear to inextricably linked within the given context. Neither would exist without the presence of the other, and showed by 'dynamicity', and 'fluidity', in so much as his experience of the other appeared to be related to the importance imposed by both parties on the purchase of the thing, itself. The context seemed enthused with emotion, and it seemed that the strength of the expressed-emotion was related to the desired item of purchase. He showed movement about a continuum at whose polarities were shame associated with not having enough money, and the desire to be seen by others as being a competent, family provider; and perhaps more significantly, 'being a man'. When these core beliefs/sedimentations were challenged it transpired that he could not bear to let his partner know that he did not have enough money to pay for items for which he, himself, had offered to contribute.

Buber (1923) argues that the distinction between 'I', and 'the Other', is made in-relation. He says that in turning to the other, both 'I', and 'the other', exist in-relation, such that it makes no sense to speak of one or the other without addressing the one, or the other – making the other independent. It is proposed that making the dependent is also a possible movement, and this may be implied within Buber's review of the 'I-it' relationship. Sartre (1960) stresses the importance of context in this equation again implying that the quality of the interchange would not be the same, if, the interchange took place in another setting. So we speak in terms of the 'I-it', or the 'I-thou', relationship; the making independent and the making dependent. An analogy may be made between this concept of being in-relation and the concept of being in relation that is the 'self of being', and the 'self of human person'. This when transformed in written language would become 'self of being-self of the human person', and

this indicates that neither could exist in real time and place in isolation of the other. One speaks to the other, and in so doing, makes the other independent, in much the same ways as Buber speaks about the 'I-thou' meeting of two people in genuine dialogue. But it is argued that we conjure-up for ourselves these apparent distinctions without realising that we are being in-relation both at the same time. We become the person who is too ashamed to communicate not having enough money, and the person who is capable of criticising ourselves for this failing, both at the same time. Neither can be superimposed on the other, nor supplant the other. But what if the dialogue between the 'two' ways of being, (i.e. 'self of being-self of the human person'), is not genuine, or 'inauthentic' as Sartre might put it.

This is a possibility that could be indicative of our propensity to express being appears to be 'fragmented', (i.e. lacking integrity). Laing (1959) seems convinced that the fragmented person disintegrates to such an extent that they present themselves in the world as 'having lost self'. Indeed, do we not all present to the world in ways, which appear to 'disguise' our true sedimentations of the world-around to some extent? When transformed, we appear to reflect our internal representations of the world-around such that they are brought into direct contact with our conscience. This call of conscience seems to shed light on these representations of the world-around with varying intensity. Our sedimentations appear to have 'mineralised' (Sartre 1958), and invokes a way of being that reflects anxiety out of the tension that arises between the 'self-of-the-human-person', and the world-around, to create a way of being-in-the-world that appears to be as 'fixed', and 'immutable'; as the 'mineralisations', themselves. We have already pondered this philosophical question and concluded that people show dynamicity from one moment to the next that reflects the dynamicity of the world-around, and our ability to respond. Our self-of-being is not fixed, and irreducible, though we appear to attach meaning with an intentionality that suggests that it is. It is not our selves-of-being that are immutable, but the meaning we ascribe to our selves-of-being that seems indicative of our selves-of-the-human-person and difficult to change. This indication is not necessarily true in itself without transformation into something that enables us to discover what is applied within the context of our everyday lives. This may be illustrated with reference to another client of mine.

This client again presents himself as someone who is abusive and violent in the world by virtue of his ability to impose his own in-relation at the expense of others. It transpired that his conscience appeared to be full of values/beliefs that conflicted with his perception of others within his lived-world. He sensed the world and being a particular way in derived meaning, which inferred a possible threat. No threat was ever realised yet he seemed adamant that he was justified in behaving in the ways that he had in-relation. He would notice that the other was doing something that he did not think was appropriate/right/proper in-relation to him. He inferred that should he allow the other to be as they had

chosen to be in-relation, s/he would have negative consequences for him in-relation with a third party. He would impose the values of the third party in order to influence the behaviour of the second party, but in so doing, transform the relationship to an 'I-it'; the other becoming an object of his will. A 'call of conscience' had resulted in the annihilation of the other as a human person in-relation with the client (Heidegger, 1927).

It was interesting to hear how his partner reflected this way of being in-relation with the client. S/he had complained of feeling vulnerable, and fearing that the client would blow up at any minute in-relation with the client. It was as if I heard the client 'speaking' to me through the other's silent voice. Silent as the other was not in the room. For me, the other represented that other part of the client that 'self of human person' that appeared to be disguised behind his 'self of being'. The client appeared to be in genuine dialogue with himself; there appeared to be no semblance; no product of the imagination; in this instance. His very soul seemed to cry out 'I am vulnerable, and I am afraid that you will blow up at any minute', the problem was that he seemed to be addressing the wrong person.

An evaluation of this client's childhood experiences seemed to indicate that his mother would inform his father of his transgressions, and the client would then be reprimanded. He would avoid being reprimanded until after the fact, by doing what he wanted to do, secretly. When discovered he would attempt to 'force' his mother not to inform on him by doing "nice things", and in so doing, "telling his mother how good he had been"; he appeared to 'be' in these ways even now with his current partner. In these ways, he avoided being confronted with his conscience – his father. Of course, he could never escape, nor avoid, this 'call of conscience' and the possibility of experiencing the negative consequences of his actions, but could always create the 'illusion', and in so doing, attempt to make it seem like he had changed: that "he wasn't that bad, really".

In the 'here-and-now', and with his current partner things had not changed, significantly. In so much, as his partner was not convinced of his innocence, and his ability to be 'different' in-relation with her, the client was confronted with a 'call of conscience' from which there was no escape, nor avoidance. In turning to the other, he was confronted with himself, perpetually. The other would say, 'I am vulnerable, and fear that you will blow up any minute, and in return he would say, 'I silence you such that my fear that you will inform on me is not realised'. The 'two' are inextricably, and dynamically linked. Neither can be 'superimposed', nor 'separated-out from' the other, such that the client appeared to present himself to me as someone who was so afraid of his own vulnerability in the world, and that would resort to violence in attempt to protect himself. His conscience had illuminated the ways in which he believed he was vulnerable in the world, however, his attempt to cast a 'shadow' on this vulnerability, merely served to illuminate his ways of being-in-the-world even the more (Heidegger, 1927). The other said to him in this moment of anguish that, 'I feel vulnerable, and I fear that you will

blow up at any minute'; and he seemed to be saying in response that, 'you are so right, but what do you want me to do': so to speak.

I ponder the possibility that 'deep down we are ultimately the same' (Kierkegaard, 1849). We appear this way or that according the context in which we find ourselves, but essentially, we are the same throughout the totality of our existence in the world. I am not convinced. Deep down there appears to be 'nothing' (Sartre, 1946). Our conscience calls to us as something we have chosen for ourselves to replace the emptiness that would exist without it (Heidegger, 1927). We create ways of being that reflect confrontation within the contexts our everyday lives, and together we created a continuum of existence that links that which appears to have been chosen for us, and that which we have created for ourselves. We do not choose our parents, but to exist in-relation with them we must choose whether or not we take on board, or assimilate and accommodate, their interpretations of existence as it appears to them, (i.e. their sedimentations). In this way, our conscience appears to be chosen for us in this context, (i.e. the family of origin). We chose for ourselves 'an actuality' that reflects 'necessity', and 'possibility' (Kierkegaard, 1846).

The client has become someone who expresses himself as a temporo-spatial being that is subject to this 'call of conscience', and his everyday experiences. He chooses to be this way or that, and 'invokes' his conscience to illuminate what he has chosen to do in-relation to his lived-world. The possibility of negative consequences seems to materialise with reference to a third party, which could then result in our experience of either physical, emotional, or spiritual pain. He distances himself from this third party in an attempt to avoid becoming someone that he himself does not value – an object of the will of others, and yet he attempts to force others to be in-relation with him in these ways. I suppose in his experience of being nothing in-relation with the other, he demonstrates this by forcing them to become as if nothing in-relation with him. He cannot escape his vulnerability, but he fears that his conscience will blow-up at any minute, both at the same time. The 'ontic' and 'ontological' become juxtaposed and inseparable. Essentially, they appear to be reflective of the same entity, and neither would exist without the prevalence of the other.

In time-limited Existential therapy, the 'call of conscience' seems to be confronted with new limitations and possibilities that both the client, and the therapist have agreed. We have agreed when our encounters will begin, and when they will end. We have agreed the subject matter of our discussions; and 'set aside' all else. By this I mean we have agreed to talk about the client's ways of being that appear to be abusive and/or violent, and 'set aside' any other ways of his being-in-the-world. For instance, where we agree to explore a clients ways of being-in-the-world that are judged violent and abusive, we have set aside those aspects of the client that are indicative of some other way of their being-in-the-world, (e.g. alcohol and drug use). We have, also, set aside our prejudgements

about the subject matter, and attempted to elucidate meaning as it occurs to us during our encounters. We have treated each aspect of our being in-relation-with-each-other, with equal importance. So for instance, we have discussed the client's apparent vulnerability in-relation to, and with, me; his apparent 'call of conscience' that appears to threaten injunction, and his attempts to cast a 'shadow' over his vulnerabilities; with equal importance. We are both confronted with ourselves, (i.e. I-thou'), in so much as we have engaged in genuine meeting of each other. So for instance I reflect for him how vulnerable he feels in-relation with me, and who he fears I may blow-up any minute, and he reflects for me how I restrain my anger that 'call of conscience that dare not speak its name'. The two appear to be inseparable, and would occur in the same ways with any one else. The only thing we haven't agreed is 'when' we should reveal ourselves to each other, and what we intend to do within the time-frame we have constructed for ourselves?

The 'call of conscience' that revealed itself in-relation with the client does not demand that I reprimand the client for some 'transgression', as this 'transgression' has not materialised for me. I have set aside my own prejudices, and as such remain completely open to the client throughout. I ask myself what has he done, exactly, in-relation with me. His reluctance to inform the other of what he has done in his own lived-world is done of his own volition. I have no desire to impose my will, which would be for him to be a bit more honest about his own fears and concerns in-relation with others. My own conscience does not call to me, saying, 'tell him to be more honest about his fears/concerns with his partner and see what happens', for instance. This decision remains for him to make. As far as our relation is concerned, my call of conscience specifies that I wait. He, too, seems confronted with my own vulnerability, and the possibility, (i.e. transcendent, or present-to-hand *Eideia*), in that I, too, may 'blow-up' at any minute. His seduction does not work: I have nothing to gain from his acknowledgment of improved ways of being in his lived-world: more to the point his acknowledgments will not transform the vulnerability, and the 'call of conscience' that threatens to consume him. We both know that our contract will end; we are in time-limited Existential therapy, and therefore, there will come a time when we will no longer be in-relation. The ontic-ontological tempero-spatial being in-relation with each other will end; at least, physically, if not mentally. By this I mean that I the residual our experience may remain in each of our minds for some time to come.

Conclusion:

It would seem the distinction between the 'self of being' and the 'self of the human person' cannot be made with any clarity. To categorise these ways of being in the world may help to organise our thoughts, but when spoken in isolation of the other, seems to detract from the totality of the person that is one, and the other; both at the same time.

I have illustrated this phenomenon with reference to a client who came to me wanting to change his violent and/or abusive behaviour. We explored how the client appeared to be in-relation with those with whom he had been abusive and/or violent, and in so doing, experienced for ourselves how we may have appeared to each other within the context of the therapeutic encounter. There seemed little difference between his response when confronted with himself, and his response when confronted with the other, such that being-with-himself, and being-with-the-other, also, showed little difference. Yet, there was no abusive no violent outburst, nor expressed anger. It was clear that there was no certainty of the client being abusive, and/or violent, with me when he experienced what I imagined would be a similar sense of vulnerability, and the 'fear that I might blow-up at any minute' during our encounters. I had made present in the 'space between us' something that he date not name in the presence of others. I had labelled it and presented it to him, and yet he did not try to justify its presence nor did he attempt to 'hide' it behind some other 'veil' of self-deception.

An abusive and/r violent response was expected given that the client had shown himself to become in these ways within the context of his everyday life. But in-relation with me the threat of being discovered by a third party, the mental representation of that which would reprimand him had been lost. The arbitrator could not enact it decision during our therapeutic encounters, and hence became deemed 'powerless'.

His response was sometimes tearful, at others shocked silence, but ultimately, waiting for his conscience to take some action. The expectation was that action would be punitive. He did not get what he may have expected, and we waited until our contract ended to see what he would do in the absence of punitive response. Ultimately he was quite alone emotionally, if not physically. This too was different to his experiences in his own lived-world. In his lived-world his partner would leave with his conscience and he blame her fore deserting him. He found it difficult to accept that he had made it difficult for her to be with him, and that shifting responsibility for her choosing to be elsewhere merely served to ensure that she would continue so do.

'Vulnerability' had left alone with his 'conscience', and he found this difficult to bear alone because isolation threaten to push over into the void of 'nothingness'. I guess, in-relation with me, I too threaten to push him over into 'the abyss': this void of nothingness'; figuratively speaking; but, he was safe in the knowledge that the contract would end at a predetermined time. In open-ended therapy, there would be no such luxury.

*Things are entirely what they appear to be, and behind them..... there appears to be nothing (Sartre, 1946)*

*Existence is the tension between life and death and the play of forces in-between (Van Deurzen Smith, 1997, pg 99)*

## References:

- Barnes, H., (1990) Sartre's Concept Of Self. In, Sartre And Psychology: Review of Existential Psychology And Psychiatry, Seattle, WA.
- Buber, M., (1923) I and Thou. W. Kaufman, (trans.) Edinburgh: T & T Clarke. 1970
- Buber, M., (1966) The Knowledge of Man. M. Friedman, and Gregor Smith (trans.) Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc.
- Heidegger, M., (1927) Being and Time. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, (trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1962.
- Jaspers, K (1951) The Way to Wisdom. R. Manheim (trans). New Haven CT: Yale University Press
- Kierkegaard, S., (1843) Fear And Trembling. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 1954
- Kierkegaard, S., (1846) Unscientific Postscript. H. Hong, and E. Hong, (trans.) Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1980)
- Kierkegaard, S., (1849) The Sickness Unto Death. H. Hong and E. Hong, (trans.). Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 1980.
- Laing, R.D., (1959)The Divided Self. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970.
- Merleau-Ponty, M., (1945) Phenomenology of Perception. C Smith (trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.. 1962
- Merleau-Ponty, M., (1968) The Visible and Invisible. A. Lingis, (trans.). Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Sartre, J-P., (1943) Being and Nothingness: an essay in phenomenological Ontology. Hazel Barnes, (trans.). New York, Phil. Library. 1956
- Sartre. J-P., (1939) Sketch for A Theory of Emotions. London: Methuen. 1962
- Spinelli, E., (1989) The Interpreted World - An Introduction to phenomenological psychology. London: Sage
- Strasser, F., Strasser, A., (1997) Existential Time-Limited Therapy: the wheel of existence. London: Wiley.
- Tillich P., (1951) The Courage To Be. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
- Van Deurzen-Smith, E., (1997) Everyday Mysteries.: Existential Dimensions of Psychotherapy. London: Routledge.
- Yalom. I., (1980) Existential Psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books.